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uring the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve took un-
precedented actions to prevent the economy from collapsing. 
First, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered 
the short-term federal funds rate nearly to its zero lower bound. Then, 
several months later, the FOMC began making large-scale purchases of 
long-term Treasury bonds to lower long-term interest rates by reducing 
the supply of long-term assets. The FOMC’s announcement of its in-
tent led to immediate and substantial declines in the yields of long-term 
Treasury bonds.
While these results suggest that changing the supplies of bonds 
available to the private sector brought about the changes in prices 
and, in turn, long-term interest rates, some economists disagree. Most 
economic models of the term structure of interest rates, including the 
widely known expectations theory, assume that supply shifts of bonds 
do not matter in determining prices. 
In various speeches, however, policymakers have suggested that 
a different economic model motivated the asset purchases. One such 
model, the preferred-habitat theory, assumes that some investors have 
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preferences for bonds of specific maturities. If this assumption is valid, 
the supplies of bonds would directly affect their prices and, in turn, 
their yields. 
The preferred-habitat model was proposed in the 1950s. It was 
widely accepted through the 1960s when it was challenged by the lack 
of empirical evidence. New empirical findings for impacts of supply 
shifts on bond yields renewed interest in the model, but the existing 
literature has never considered how it might be affected by the zero 
lower bound.  
Interest in the theory increased when the short-term policy rate ap-
proached the zero lower bound and policymakers used asset purchases 
as a policy alternative. But some observers have questioned whether 
asset purchases could really lower long-term interest rates.  
To answer this question, this article uses a preferred-habitat model 
that explicitly considers the zero bound for nominal interest rates. The 
analysis suggests that purchasing assets on a large scale can effective-
ly lower long-term interest rates. Furthermore, when heightened risk 
aversion disrupts the activities of arbitrageurs, policymakers may lower 
long-term rates more effectively through asset purchases than through 
communicating their intentions to lower the expected path of future 
short-term rates.
The first section of this article reviews economic theories of the term 
structure of interest rates and identifies the effects of supply shifts on 
bond yields. The second section describes a baseline model in which rela-
tive supplies of bonds of different maturities determine bond yields. The 
third section extends the baseline model by explicitly incorporating the 
zero bound for nominal interest rates and discusses when asset purchases 
can be a more effective policy tool than other policy alternatives. 
I.   TERM STRUCTURE THEORIES AND PRICE IMPACTS 
OF BOND SUPPLY SHIFTS 
When the Federal Reserve purchased long-term Treasury bonds as 
a policy tool, the rationale was that, by causing the supplies of bonds to 
contract, bond prices would rise. The higher prices, in turn, would cause 
long-term interest rates to fall. The downward shift of the yield curve 
of Treasury bonds after the announcement of asset purchases supports 
such a view (Chart 1). However, widely known term structure models, ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  7
such as the expectations model, imply that supplies do not matter in 
determining prices. The preferred-habitat model, by contrast, supports 
the idea that supplies matter. This section examines the two theories 
and reviews the empirical evidence supporting the opposing views.  
Relative supplies do not matter 
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates 
assumes that current and expected yields of short-term bonds deter-
mine yields of long-term bonds, while the supplies of the bonds do not 
affect yields. The theory is based on the view that when the expected 
return of one asset is higher than that of another asset, investors will 
trade those assets to make a profit. In other words, short-term and long-
term bonds are substitutes for one another. 
As Chart 2 shows, when the assets are perfect substitutes, the de-
mand curve for assets is flat. For example, suppose that the long-term 
bond yield is higher than the average of the current short-term interest 
rate and short-term rates expected over the life of the long-term bond. 
Chart 1
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In this case, investors can earn a positive expected return from buying 
a long-term bond by borrowing money in the short-term bond market. 
Similarly, when the long-term rate is lower than current and future ex-
pectations of the short-term rate, investors can earn a positive expected 
return from buying short-term bonds consecutively and short-selling 
a long-term bond. This strategy equalizes the expected return on long 
and short-term bonds, making them perfect substitutes. 
With flat demand curves, the relative supplies of the assets do not 
matter because they do not affect the current short rate or future expec-
tations of the short rate. A reduction in the supply of the bond does not 
have any impact on the bond yield (Chart 2). 
In  the  expectations  hypothesis,  investors  are  risk-neutral. They 
want to maximize their expected return, regardless of maturity, and do 
not demand additional compensation for exposing themselves to the 
future uncertainty of investing in long-term bonds. Therefore, long-
term bonds carry no term premia, which are excess returns over the 
average of the current and future expectations of the short rate. 
In reality, however, investors are risk-averse and demand term premia. 
The term premia of long-term bonds are time-varying and positive on 
average (Campbell and Shiller). Models more elaborate than the expec-
tations hypothesis allow term premia for long-term bonds to be time-
varying. In such models, long-term bond yields deviate somewhat from 
the values implied by the expectations hypothesis due to the term premia.
Chart 2
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Term premia are determined as the product of the amount of risk 
and the compensation per one unit of risk measure. We typically mea-
sure the amount of risk by the variance of a variable. The additional 
compensation per one unit of risk measure is often called the “market 
price of risk.” The market price of risk can be specified as constant as in 
Vasicek (1977) or time-varying as in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). 
Alternatively, it can be derived from consumers’ risk aversion toward 
varying their spending over time and the covariance of bond prices with 
consumption (Piazzesi and Schneider). But in all these cases, it does not 
depend on bond quantities.1
When term premia are sufficient to compensate for differences in 
risk between short-term and long-term bonds, investors view the ex-
pected returns to the bonds as being equal, taking risk into account. In 
this case, investors are indifferent to bond maturities. For example, sup-
pose the yield on three-month bonds is expected to remain at 5 percent 
from today through the next five years. Suppose further that, as com-
pensation for holding a five-year bond instead of three-month bonds, 
investors require an additional 1 percent in interest. Then investors will 
be equally willing to hold a five-year bond that pays 6 percent interest 
and three-month bonds that pay 5 percent interest. As a result, inves-
tors view these bonds of different maturities as perfect substitutes, and 
relative supplies will not affect the yields on the bonds because they do 
not change the amount of risk or investors’ risk aversion. This theory, 
like the expectations hypothesis, implies demand curves for bonds are 
flat.2  
Relative supplies matter 
The preferred-habitat theory assumes that bonds of different matur-
ities are not perfect substitutes because investors often have preferences 
for bonds with specific maturities (Culbertson; Modigliani and Sutch). 
For example, pension funds prefer long-term bonds, while money mar-
ket mutual funds prefer short-term bonds. For these investors, bonds of 
different maturities are not perfect substitutes.3 As a result, as indicated 
in Chart 3, the demand curve for a bond of any particular maturity is 
not flat and supply shifts directly affect bond yields (in the chart, the 
demand curve slopes up as a function of yield, but it would slope down 
as a function of price).410  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In an extreme version of the preferred-habitat model, each group 
of investors wants to buy a bond of a particular maturity, and no one 
participates in bond markets of different maturities. In such a case, the 
bond markets are completely segmented, and each bond yield is de-
termined solely by the demand of the preferred-habitat investors for a 
particular maturity and the available supply of the bond. 
In reality, arbitrageurs such as investment banks and hedge funds 
trade bonds of different maturities to make profits. By buying a low-
valued bond and selling a high-valued bond, these arbitrageurs integrate 
bond markets of different maturities. For example, suppose that the 
supply of the 10-year bond suddenly increases. With the demand of 
preferred-habitat investors unchanged, this supply shock will induce a 
jump in the yield of the 10-year bond. This jump in the 10-year yield 
triggers arbitrageurs to buy the 10-year bond and sell bonds of other 
maturities. As a result, the 10-year bond yield increases less, and other 
bond yields increase. 
When arbitrageurs coexist with preferred-habitat investors, the risk 
aversion of arbitrageurs plays an important role in determining the slope 
of demand curves for bonds. If arbitrageurs are risk-neutral, bonds of 
different maturities are perfect substitutes. Since arbitrageur demand 
can dominate that of the preferred-habitat investors, the demand curves 
for bonds would be flat at levels dictated by the expectations hypothesis. 
Chart 3
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In contrast, if arbitrageurs are extremely risk-averse, they would not be 
willing to trade bonds, and the preferred-habitat investor demand will 
be dominant in determining bond yields. In this case, demand curves 
will be steep. 
In the intermediate case in which arbitrageurs are risk-averse but 
willing to trade bonds of different maturities if there are significant 
discrepancies in yields, demand curves won’t be flat. Risk-averse arbitra-
geurs care about both the expected return and the risk of trading prof-
its for a short time period. Compared to short-term bonds, long-term 
bond prices are more sensitive to changes in the future short-term in-
terest rates. The duration of a bond measures this sensitivity, and long-
term bonds have higher duration than short-term bonds. As a result, 
given the potential for changes in short-term interest rates, arbitrageurs 
who have relatively more long-term bonds now take bigger risks of trad-
ing profits than others with relatively fewer long-term bonds. Accord-
ingly, a higher premium is required to induce arbitrageurs whose bond 
portfolio has a longer duration to take a given amount of risk. In other 
words, the market price of risk increases as the duration of arbitrageurs’ 
bond portfolios lengthens. Therefore, term premia are higher when 
there are relatively more supplies of long-term bonds, and arbitrageurs 
have to hold them in equilibrium. 
For risk-averse arbitrageurs, the maturity structure of their bond 
holdings affects their subjective valuation of a payoff to an investment. 
Thus, bonds of different maturities are imperfect substitutes for them 
even though they do not have inherent preferences for specific maturi-
ties like preferred-habitat investors. Consequently, demand curves for 
bonds from these risk-averse arbitrageurs are not flat, and relative sup-
plies of bonds do matter in this model. In this case, the central bank’s 
direct purchases of long-term bonds can lower long-term rates. 
Empirical evidence on price impacts of supply shifts  
Since economic theories generate different predictions for the effect 
of supply shifts on the prices of bonds of different maturities, empirical 
studies are necessary for evaluating which theory better describes the 
real world. A few past episodes permit identification of shifts in the 
supplies of bonds available to the private sector. 12  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Early empirical studies focused on the effectiveness of Operation 
Twist (OT) in 1962-64. The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
raised the supply of short-term government debt while simultaneously 
lowering the supply of long-term debt. The main goal of this operation 
was to reduce the capital account deficit by elevating short-term interest 
rates and to stimulate investment by lowering long-term interest rates. 
In order to accomplish this, the Federal Reserve sold short-term bonds 
and purchased long-term bonds. The U.S. Treasury also purchased an 
unspecified volume of long-term bonds for its investment accounts. 
Several studies found that OT was not effective in flattening the 
term structure (Modigliani and Sutch; Kuttner). The impact of the 
operation on the spread between the long rate and the short rate was 
found to be small and could be explained by changes in regulations, 
such as the successive increases in the ceiling for time deposit rates un-
der Regulation Q. The lack of empirical evidence for price impacts of 
OT cast doubts on the preferred-habitat view on which the operation 
was based. 
However, more recent studies caution against reading too much 
into this episode. For example, Kuttner (2006) argues that OT was 
not definitive evidence against large-scale asset purchases because the 
size of operations was relatively modest. In fact, the Fed’s purchases of 
government securities with a maturity of more than one year in 1961 
totaled only $2.6 billion. This amount was less than 3 percent of the 
marketable amount of these securities at that time. 
The size of operation matters in determining the price impacts of 
supply shifts. Another, more revealing example is the Treasury buyback 
program of 2000-01. As the federal government’s budget surplus swelled 
in the United States in 2000, the Treasury began repurchasing long-dat-
ed bonds that were issued at higher interest rates. Between March 2000 
and December 2001, the Treasury conducted 40 buybacks, covering 42 
long-term bonds with a combined face value of $63.5 billion. The size 
of this operation amounted to about 10 percent of the December 1999 
outstanding value of marketable long-term government bonds (Green-
wood and Vayanos 2010a). 
Unlike OT, the announcement of the buyback program significant-
ly affected long-term bond yields. The buybacks narrowed the spread ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  13
between the 20-year rate and the one-year rate by 0.75 percent three 
weeks after the announcement (Garbade and Rutherford). 
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) provide additional evidence 
of price impacts of supply shifts. In this case, large-scale purchases of 
long-term U.S. Treasury bonds by the Japanese government from 2003 
to 2004 lowered the yields of five-year and 10-year bonds by an average 
of 0.5 to 1 percent. 
In sum, recent empirical studies support price impacts of supply shifts 
in bonds of different maturities, at least for large-scale operations. This 
evidence might have motivated large-scale purchases of long-term govern-
ment bonds by major central banks during the recent financial crisis. 
But unlike the previous episodes, recent interventions were made 
under extraordinary circumstances—a short rate near the zero lower 
bound and the collapse of major financial intermediaries. Theoretical 
and empirical studies reviewed in this section do not explicitly consider 
such extraordinary conditions. The following sections use a modern 
version of the preferred-habitat theory of the term structure of interest 
rates to explore the rationale for large-scale asset purchases in situations 
similar to the recent financial crisis. 
II.   A  MODERN  VIEW  OF  THE  PREFERRED-HABITAT 
THEORY
In a preferred-habitat model that includes risk-averse arbitrageurs, 
the choices that arbitrageurs make about their bond portfolios play an 
important role in determining interest rates. This section uses a formal 
framework based on a preferred-habitat model developed by Vayanos 
and Vila (2009) to analyze the effects of asset purchases on the port-
folio choices of arbitrageurs and, in turn, bond yields. The appendix 
provides the details of the model.
The baseline model 
The preferred-habitat model has two central ingredients (Cochrane). 
First, preferred-habitat investors trade bonds of their preferred maturities 
and do not buy or sell bonds across maturities, while arbitrageurs buy 
and sell across maturities. Second, arbitrageurs choose bond portfolios to 
maximize their expected future wealth, adjusted for risk.14  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In principle, the bond demand of preferred-habitat investors can be 
derived from their underlying objectives under some technical assump-
tions.5 For this analysis, it suffices to assume their demand to be a linear 
function of the bond yield. For example, investors with a preference 
for five-year maturities buy or sell five-year bonds based on their yields. 
Since the relationship between the yield and demand is linear, investors 
buy or sell the same amount of the bond for a given change in the bond 
yield. Movements in yields on bonds of different maturities have no 
effect on demand for the five-year bond. 
Supplies of bonds available to arbitrageurs are determined by sub-
tracting the demand of preferred-habitat investors from the government’s 
net issuance. In determining how to maximize risk-adjusted future wealth, 
arbitrageurs adjust for the risk of their bond portfolio by subtracting from 
expected future wealth (the mean of future wealth) an amount propor-
tional to the variance of their future wealth. Thus, an arbitrageur’s port-
folio choice depends on risk aversion. If arbitrageurs are more risk-averse, 
they deduct a larger amount from the mean of their future wealth for a 
given magnitude of the variance. In the model, they have a short planning 
horizon and care only about wealth in the next period. Their objective is 
to maximize the mean of their next period’s wealth, adjusted by the vari-
ance of future wealth and by their risk aversion. 
The model of Vayanos and Vila assumes that preferred-habitat in-
vestors and arbitrageurs continuously trade bonds of many different 
maturities even over a very short time. Deriving equilibrium bond 
yields under this setting is mathematically complicated. This article’s 
analysis uses a simplified model with three periods and two types of 
bonds. The short-term bond matures one period after its issue date, 
while the long-term bond matures after two periods.
In this simplified model, the only source of uncertainty is the short-
term interest rate. The short rate follows a mean-reverting process. If 
there is a gap between the current short rate and the mean, the gap is 
expected to decrease gradually to zero over time. However, a random 
shock in each period can cause the realized short rate to differ from the 
expected value. This assumption is common to many term structure 
models (for example, Vasicek; Cox and others) and parsimoniously cap-
tures the risk factors that determine the term structure of interest rates.6ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  15
The time variation of the short-term rate introduces a risk to ar-
bitrage activities. Arbitrageurs who borrow money at the short rate to 
buy a long-term bond face an uncertain future short rate. How much 
this uncertainty affects the long-term bond yield depends on various 
factors. One crucial factor is the coefficient determining the risk adjust-
ment for the variance of arbitrageurs’ future wealth. If this coefficient is 
high, arbitrageurs will demand a greater increment in expected wealth 
for taking a given amount of risk. Hence, the coefficient shows up in 
the market price of risk in the model.7 Hereafter, this parameter will be 
referred to as the risk-aversion coefficient of arbitrageurs. 
Price impacts of supply shifts in the baseline model 
As a first step in exploring policymakers’ rationale for purchasing 
bonds, this analysis considers an experiment using the baseline model. 
Suppose a supply shock changes the quantity of long-term bonds avail-
able for arbitrageurs. In this case, the shock comes from the central 
bank directly purchasing long-term bonds to reduce their supply. 
The effects on bond yields of shifting supplies depend on multiple 
factors. These factors include the size of the purchases, the elasticity of 
the preferred-habitat investors’ demand for the bonds, and the mag-
nitude of uncertainty about the future short rate. This discussion will 
focus on the risk-aversion coefficient of arbitrageurs, which helps to de-
termine the slope of the demand curve for long-term bonds.8 This coef-
ficient is particularly interesting because its magnitude can be matched 
with the degree of financial market stress that depresses arbitrage activi-
ties. The parameter is particularly relevant in evaluating the effective-
ness of asset purchases in the context of a financial crisis.9
Chart 4 shows the model’s predicted response of long-term bond 
yields to a reduction in the supply of bonds for two different levels of 
risk aversion.10 In each panel, the horizontal axis shows a range of pos-
sible values of the short-term interest rate. The lines give the level of the 
long-term interest rate consistent with the optimal portfolio choice of 
arbitrageurs at the level of the short rate indicated on the horizontal axis. 
By assumption, the short rate evolves independently of arbitrage activi-
ties, and supply shifts do not affect the short rate.16  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 4
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When arbitrageurs are risk-neutral, long-term interest rates are de-
termined by the current and expected future short-term rates (Chart 4, 
top panel). In this case, a supply shock that reduces the supply of the 
long-term bond available to arbitrageurs has no effect on the long-term 
bond yield. In contrast, when the risk-aversion coefficient is high, the 
same supply shock can significantly change the level of the long-term 
bond yield (bottom panel).
Directly estimating the risk-aversion coefficient is difficult, but 
empirical evidence suggests that the risk aversion of arbitrageurs was 
heightened during the recent financial crisis. After the failure of Lehm-
an Brothers, arbitrage activities of major financial institutions were 
severely hampered, leading to abnormal price dispersion of relatively 
similar Treasury securities.11 For example, the 10-year bond issued in 
2002 and the five-year bond issued in 2007, bonds that would mature 
at similar dates, provided about the same cash flows to bond hold-
ers. Under normal situations, arbitrage activities would have made the 
prices of the two bonds very similar. However, the bonds traded at 
substantially different prices during the period of financial turmoil.12 
Additional information on the risk aversion of arbitrageurs can be 
gleaned from other spread measures between financial assets with simi-
lar cash flow streams and risk characteristics. The Kansas City Financial 
Stress Index describes financial market stress by extracting a common 
component from 11 financial market variables (Hakkio and Keeton). 
The index captures the decreased willingness of arbitrageurs to hold 
risky or illiquid assets and the increased uncertainty about asset prices. 
Not surprisingly, the index shows a spike after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers (Chart 5). 
Under such circumstances, the central bank’s direct purchases of 
long-term assets might be expected to substantially affect the prices of 
these assets, shedding light on policymakers’ actions.13 When arbitrage 
activities of financial markets are disrupted, and deteriorating macro-
economic conditions warrant lower long-term interest rates, long-term 
asset purchases by the central bank can be an effective policy tool. 18  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
III.  THE  ZERO  LOWER  BOUND  FOR  NOMINAL   
INTEREST  RATES  AND  THE  EFFICACY  OF  ASSET 
PURCHASES
The zero lower bound is relevant for evaluating the effectiveness of 
long-term bond purchases by central banks during the recent financial 
crisis for two reasons. First, the zero lower bound became a binding 
constraint as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank 
of Japan pushed down short-term policy rates. Second, the zero lower 
bound decreases the uncertainty about the future short rate by capping 
the possible decline of the short rate. 
Declining uncertainty about the future short rate can affect the size 
of the term premium of the long-term bond. In the preferred-habitat 
model, the term premium of the long-term bond changes with shifts 
in supply. Hence, it is important to examine whether long-term bond 
purchases remain effective in affecting the long-term bond yield at the 
zero bound for nominal interest rates. This section reviews some impli-
cations of the zero bound for the term structure of interest rates in the 
modern preferred-habitat model. The model is also used to compare 
Chart 5
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the relative effectiveness of pursuing policy through asset purchases ver-
sus managing expectations of the future short rate. 
Implications of the zero lower bound for long-term interest rates 
Once the short rate hits the zero bound, the future short-term rate 
cannot fall below the current level, and the expectations of future short 
rates are higher than otherwise (Ruge-Murcia). However, the zero lower 
bound reduces the effective variation of the future short-term rate and 
may cause the term premia of long-term bond yields to drop. To pre-
cisely identify channels through which the zero lower bound affects 
long-term bond yields, it is useful to decompose long-term bond yields 
into two components: 1) the average of current and future expectations 
of the short rate and 2) the term premium. 
Chart 6 illustrates the impacts of the zero lower bound for the over-
all level and each component of the long-term bond yield, as implied 
by the preferred-habitat model. Panel A, which shows the overall level 
of the long-term bond yield, suggests that the existence of the zero 
lower bound decreases the level of the long-term bond yield. 
To understand why, it is useful to begin with the implications of 
the expectations hypothesis. In the expectations hypothesis, the term 
premium is constant and does not depend on the level of the short rate. 
Therefore, because the zero lower bound implies a path of short-term 
interest rates steeper than the path might otherwise be, it implies a 
higher level of the long-term interest rate when the short rate is close to 
zero. Why, then, does the preferred-habitat theory result in the fall in 
the long-term bond yield shown in Chart 6 (Panel A)?
The preferred-habitat theory implies a lower long-term interest rate 
because the zero lower bound affects the term premium as well as the 
expectations of future short-term rates. In the preferred-habitat model, 
as in the expectations hypothesis, expectations of future short rates are 
higher near the zero bound (Chart 6, Panel B). So the difference in the 
overall level of the long-term bond yield across the two theories can be 
attributed to the term premium. In the preferred-habitat theory, the 
term premium can actually be lower near the zero bound (Panel C). 
With the zero lower bound, the overall level of the long-term bond 
yield is reduced because the smaller term premium more than offsets 
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Chart 6
LONG-TERM BOND YIELD AND TERM PREMIUM
Why is the term premium lower in the preferred-habitat model 
near the zero lower bound? Recall that the term premium is determined 
by the market price of risk and the amount of risk. For the zero lower 
bound to alter the term premium, it should affect at least one of these 
two determinants. In the preferred-habitat model, the market price of 
risk is determined by the risk-aversion coefficient of arbitrageurs and 
the duration of their bond portfolios, but not directly by the existence 
of the zero lower bound. However, the amount of risk (which is the 
variance of the future short rate in the model) is directly affected by 
the zero lower bound. The zero lower bound reduces the variance of 
the future short-term rate when the current short rate is close to zero. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  21
Hence, the term premium can decrease when the current short rate is 
close to the zero lower bound. 
The efficacy of asset purchases as a way to lower long-term interest rates 
at the zero lower bound
As shown above, without the zero lower bound, long-term asset 
purchases can be more effective in lowering the term premium when 
the risk aversion of arbitrageurs is high. However, highly risk-averse 
arbitrageurs will be more sensitive to changes in the amount of risk. 
Since arbitrageurs will consider that their risk will decrease near the 
zero lower bound, the size of the impact of long-term asset purchases 
on the term premium will also change, depending on the degree of the 
risk aversion of arbitrageurs. 
Further, the preferred-habitat model with the zero lower bound is a 
useful framework to evaluate the relative effectiveness of various policy 
options at the zero lower bound. This framework is suitable because 
both asset purchases and managing the expectations of the future short 
rate can affect long-term interest rates. 
In the preferred-habitat model, policymakers have at least three 
tools to lower long-term interest rates when the current short-term rate 
is sufficiently above the zero bound. First, they can cut the current short 
rate and expect arbitrageurs to push down the long-term rate. Second, 
they can communicate that the future path of the short rate is likely to 
be lower than previously thought by the private sector. This strategy 
also relies on arbitrageurs taking advantage of lower expectations of 
the future short rates. Third, the central bank can reduce relative sup-
plies of long-term bonds available to the private sector by making direct 
purchases.
When the economy is near the zero bound, however, the first op-
tion is not effective, leaving a central bank with two options for lower-
ing long-term interest rates: purchasing long-term bonds and commu-
nicating that the future path of short-term interest rates is likely to be 
lower than normally justified by the state of economy. 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue in the context of a com-
mon small-scale macroeconomic model that this communication strat-
egy is indeed the best monetary policy tool at the zero bound. They ar-
gue that asset purchases are ineffective unless they change expectations 
of future short rates. However, in their model relative supplies of bonds 22  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
do not matter in determining bond yields. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the communication strategy is more effective in such a model. 
In the preferred-habitat model, arbitrageurs make profits by bor-
rowing money at the short-term rate and buying the long-term bond 
when the current short rate is low. Promising to keep the short rate at 
a low level for a longer period than normally justified boosts the profit 
opportunities of arbitrageurs because the risk of facing a higher short-
term interest rate in the future is reduced. This communication strat-
egy lowers the long-term interest rate directly by reducing the expected 
future short rate and indirectly by lowering the term premium through 
reducing the risk of arbitrage activities. 
The communication strategy can be incorporated into the pre-
ferred-habitat model in a simple way. The expected future short rate in 
the model is a weighted average of the current short rate and the long-
term average (or “normal”) level of the short rate. The communication 
strategy can be captured by increasing the model’s weight on the cur-
rent short rate in determining the expected future short rate when the 
current rate is low. In other words, the communication strategy can be 
modeled by assuming that policymakers can increase the expected time 
for the short rate to reach the normal level from the current low level. 
In this framework, when are asset purchases more effective in low-
ering long rates than lowering the future path of the short-term interest 
rate? The risk-aversion coefficient of arbitrageurs again plays an impor-
tant role in this comparison. When the coefficient is higher, arbitra-
geurs are less willing to purchase long-term bonds, other things being 
equal. Accordingly, more profits would be required to induce them to 
buy a given amount of long-term assets from preferred-habitat inves-
tors. The implication is that, if risk aversion is high, the central bank 
needs to promise a more extended period of low rates in the future in 
order to lower long-term rates via a communication strategy. Under 
these circumstances, the central bank’s direct purchases would be more 
effective.15
Chart 7 compares how these two policy options affect long-term 
interest rates. In the bottom panel, the risk-aversion coefficient of arbi-
trageurs is roughly ten times that in the top panel. The magnitude is in 
line with the spike of the financial market stress index in Hakkio and 
Keeton from the beginning of the recent financial crisis (August 2007) ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  23
Chart 7
RISK  AVERSION  AND  RELATIVE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF   
ASSET PURCHASES
Note: The horizontal axis is the shadow short rate which can be negative. The shadow rate describes the state of 
economy but the short-term bond yield stays at zero when the shadow rate is negative. When the shadow rate is 
positive, it is equal to the actual short-term bond yield. The idea of using the shadow rate as describing the state of 
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EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE  ON  THE  IMPACTS  OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S RECENT LONG-TERM 
TREASURY BOND PURCHASES 
The quantitative effects of the Federal Reserve’s recent as-
set purchase program to influence long-term bond yields have 
been the subject of some debate. Some researchers noted that 
the 10-year Treasury yield returned to its pre-announcement 
level in only five weeks, as shown in Chart B1 below. The rela-
tively quick reversion of the 10-year Treasury bond yield may 
indicate the asset purchases were ineffective. 
Chart B1 
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Source: Federal Reserve Board, Thorton (2009)  
However, a number of factors may have affected long-term 
Treasury bond yields during this five-week period. For example, 
the improved economic outlook and diminished financial mar-
ket stress may have pushed up expectations of future short rates, 
in turn increasing long-term interest rates. Indeed, the dates that 
the 10-year Treasury yield jumped by double-digit basis points 
usually coincided with new signs that the housing market im-ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  25
proved (March 25, April 28), with the release of better-than-
expected consumer confidence survey data (April 17), and with 
news of a positive outlook for the financial sector (April 9).19 
Carefully sorting out these complicating factors is critical for 
making precise estimates of the price effects of asset purchases. 
These factors can be accounted for by including them as 
explanatory variables for changes in yields. A regression can 
then be run with the 10-year yield using proxies for policy ex-
pectations and the real activity index published by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, as well as dummies for the break 
before and after the FOMC announcement in March 2009 of 
its plan to make the asset purchases. 
The two-year overnight index swap rate captures the mar-
ket’s expectations of the average short rate over the time period. 
News about improving economic conditions can push up the 
market’s expectations of future short rates. Also, the real ac-
tivity index reflects the changing economic outlook. Both of 
these variables are used as proxies for the shadow short rate, 
which can be negative while the observed short rate is at the 
zero bound. 
This regression sets the dummy value to zero for the pre-
March announcement days and to one thereafter. If there are 
no persistent price effects of asset purchases, the coefficient of 
the dummy variable should be close to zero. Regression results 
in Table B1 suggest that the Federal Reserve’s purchase an-
nouncement reduced the 10-year Treasury yield. Hence, there 
seems to be at least some empirical support for the reduction 
of the term premium due to the bond purchases, as implied 
by the preferred-habitat theory. This finding is consistent with 
the conclusion from a more extensive empirical study (Gagnon 
and others). 26  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table B1
REGRESSION OF THE 10-YEAR YIELD
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error
Constant   4.39   .69*
2-year Overnight Index Swap     .28   .32
Business Cycle Index     .66   .10*
Dummy for Asset Purchases     -.39   .17*
                  R 2=0.82
Source: Author’s calculation. Weekly average data from January 2009 to June 2009 are used in case 
of the 10-year yield, overnight index swap, and business cycle index. An asterisk indicates that a coef-
ficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  27
to the peak (October 2008).16  As indicated in the lower panel of the 
chart, when risk aversion is high and short-term interest rates are very 
low, policymakers may be able to lower long-term bond yields some-
what more effectively through asset purchases than through a commu-
nication strategy.17 (For empirical evidence on the impacts of the recent 
large-scale purchases of long-term Treasury bonds, see box.)
Another cost of managing expectations by communication is that 
this strategy is prone to the risk of destabilizing inflation expectations 
when the central bank’s credibility for pursuing low inflation is not 
perfect. Policymakers seem to be worried about this risk (Kohn). Large-
scale asset purchases could be a more reliable option for policymakers 
at the zero lower bound since they do not directly target expectations.18
IV.   CONCLUSIONS
The recent financial crisis demanded innovative ideas from policy-
makers. Examining the Federal Reserve’s rationale for taking unconven-
tional policy actions during the crisis is important for future guidance. 
This article focused on the efficacy of large-scale purchases of long-term 
Treasury bonds as a policy option when nominal interest rates were near 
the zero lower bound. 
Using a simplified version of the preferred-habitat model developed 
by Vayanos and Vila, this article finds that by altering the supplies of 
long-term bonds, the central bank’s large-scale purchases of the bonds 
can decrease the term premia in long-term bond yields. The magnitude 
of the decline in the term premium depends crucially on the risk aver-
sion of arbitrageurs. If the risk aversion of arbitrageurs is high, as in the 
recent financial crisis, large-scale asset purchases can induce a more sub-
stantial decline in the term premium. In addition, when the arbitrage 
activities of the private sector are disrupted and the economy is near 
the zero lower bound, large-scale asset purchases may lower long-term 
interest rates more effectively than other policy options, such as a com-
mitment to keep rates lower than otherwise justified.  28  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX
This analysis considers a simplified version of the Vayanos and Vila 
(2009) model. The simplified model assumes three periods with two 
types of default-free bonds available for investors. The first type is a 
short-term bond that matures in the next period. The second type is a 
long-term bond that matures two periods later. In this model, the only 
risk factor is the shadow interest rate for the short-term bond (xt ) The 
variable evolves according to the following AR (1) process: 
x r x t t t + { } + = − ( ) + + 1 1 1 ρ ρ σε .
Here, et+1is a standard normal random variable. r is the uncondi-
tional mean of the shadow short rate. r and s are parameters governing 
the persistence and conditional standard deviation of the shadow rate, 
respectively. When the shadow rate is nonnegative, it is the same as the 
realized short-term interest rate. However, the realized short-term inter-
est rate (rt ) is zero if the shadow rate is negative. 
Investors have preferences for the long-term bond and do not par-
ticipate in the short-term bond market. Net supply of the long-term 
bond available to arbitrageurs (Yt)is obtained by subtracting the de-
mand by preferred-habitat investors from the net issuance of the total 
government bond supply. The model assumes that the net supply of the 
long-term bond depends linearly on its yield (Rt). The price sensitivity 
of bond demand by the preferred-habitat investors is characterized by 
α. The parameter β determines the intercept of the net supply of the 
long-term bond available to arbitrageurs.
Y R t t = − α β ( ).
  Arbitrageurs participate in both short-term and long-term bond 
markets and take positions to maximize the following objective func-
tion defined over the mean (Et ) and the variance (Vt ) of the next pe-
riod’s wealth (WT+1): 
E W V W W W e L e e t t t t t t
r
t
R r r t t t t ( ) ( ), ( + + +







In these equations, τ is the risk-aversion coefficient, and  Lt is the 
holding of the long-term bond by arbitrageurs. In equilibrium,L Y t t = . 
The short-term interest rate affects demand for the long-term bond by   ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  29
arbitrageurs and in turn influences the equilibrium long-term bond 
yield. With the zero lower bound, the relevant state variable determin-
ing the equilibrium long-term bond yield is not the realized short-term 
interest rate but the shadow rate. 
Equilibrium conditions are highly nonlinear with respect to bond 
yields, especially when the zero lower bound is considered. Nonethe-
less, it is easy to figure out that the risk aversion would show up in the 
equilibrium condition only in the form of being multiplied by the price 
sensitivity of bond demand of preferred-habitat investors. This occurs 
because the derivative of expected wealth with respect to the amount of 
the long-term bond held by arbitrageurs is constant while the derivative 
of the variance of wealth is proportional to the holding by arbitrageurs. 
In equilibrium, arbitrageurs’ bond holding is equal to the bond 
supply of the preferred-habitat investors, which is linear with respect to 
the price sensitivity parameter. Thus, the equilibrium condition takes 
the following form: 
k g R x r t t = ( ) τα ρ σ , ; , , ,
where k is a constant determined by other parameters in the model. 
The solution for the long-term bond yield can be found by using a 
numerical nonlinear equation solver at each grid point. 
If we assume that the time interval is small, we can approximate the 
next period wealth of arbitrageurs as follows:20
W W r L R r r t t t t t t t + + = + + − − 1 1 1 2 ( ) ( )
Using the optimality condition for arbitrageurs’ long-term bond 
holding and equilibrium condition, it is possible to derive the expres-
sion below for the long-term bond yield. To further simplify the model, 
it is assumed that the net supply of bond available to arbitrageurs is 
inelastic with respect to the bond yield as in Cochrane (2008). In other 
words, Lt = β . Then the equilibrium long-term bond yield is given by
When the long rate is not at the zero bound, we obtain the follow-
ing closed form expression for the market price of risk, which is the 
R x r
t
t = + + − +
−
max ( ) ( ) .  0
1 1
2
2 ρ ρ τβσ { {
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expected excess return of buying the long-term bond divided by the 
conditional variance of the shadow rate:
2 1
2




Notice that the supply of the long-term bond directly affects the 
market price of risk in this case. Policies affecting supplies of bonds 
available to the private sector can be modeled by changing a param-
eter determining the intercept of the net supply of bonds available to 
arbitrageurs (β ). Reducing β  decreases the long-term bond yield. In-
terestingly, the impact is larger when arbitrageurs are more risk-averse 
(higher τ) or the uncertainty of the shadow rate is greater (higher s 2). 
 The communication strategy of lowering the future policy path 
of the short rate can be modeled by increasing the persistence param-
eter of the short rate process (r) so that the short rate moves up more 
slowly once it approaches the zero bound. When the current short rate 
is smaller than the mean, increasing r can also decrease the long-term 
bond yield. However, unlike asset purchases, its effectiveness depends on 
the distance between the current shadow rate and the mean short rate, 
not on the risk aversion coefficient or the uncertainty of shadow rate. 
Therefore, a higher risk-aversion coefficient can increase the relative ef-
fectiveness of asset purchases compared to the communication strategy. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  31
ENDNOTES
1Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) assume that investors benefit 
directly from holding Treasury assets due to their convenience in easy trading. 
This benefit is independent of their consumption. In this case, relative supplies 
can matter if Treasury bonds of different maturities are imperfect substitutes for 
investors due to different degrees of convenience benefit. 
2However, due to term premia, the levels of demand curves implied by this 
theory differ from the levels implied by the expectations hypothesis.
3Greenwood and Vayanos (2010a) document the clientele effects for pension 
funds in the U.K. government bond markets. In the U.S., the Treasury depart-
ment’s decision to reissue the 30-year nominal bond in 2006 was regarded as a 
response to demands from pension funds seeking longer-dated securities to match 
liabilities (Chicago Tribune, August 3, 2005 “U.S. bringing back 30-year Treasury 
bond”). 
4Kuttner (2006) also emphasizes that non-flat demand curves are essential for 
obtaining price impacts of relative supply shifts in bonds of different maturities.
5The appendix in Vayanos and Vila (2009) shows that if investors want to 
minimize the maximum risk of their consumption at a particular maturity, their 
bond demand would be similar to the one assumed in the paper. 
6Suppose that the short rate is set by a version of Taylor rule in which policy-
makers adjust the short rate by responding to macroeconomic variables. If mac-
roeconomic variables fluctuate over time and policymakers respond to them in a 
stable way, the short rate itself can summarize the evolution of macroeconomic 
variables.
7The appendix provides a complete description of the market price of risk in 
a special case of the baseline model using the approximation to budget constraints 
of arbitrageurs. 
8Price impacts are greater when the scale of purchases is greater, preferred-
habitat investors’ demand is more price-sensitive, or the uncertainty about the 
future short rate is higher. 
9Vayanos and Vila (2009) emphasize that high risk-aversion can mitigate 
the transmission of the central bank’s decision on the short-term interest rate 
to long-term interest rates. They conjecture that direct purchases of long-term 
bonds might be more effective in influencing long-term rates when arbitrageurs 
are highly risk-averse. 
10In the model, we can capture this supply shock in a reduced form as a shift 
in the intercept of the net supply of the bond available to arbitrageurs.  
11Price dispersion can be measured by the prediction errors of the smoothed 
yield curve. During the financial crisis, that measure increased from the normal 
level of 2 basis points to 20 basis points (Macroeconomic Advisers). 32  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
12Gromb and Vayanos (2002) provide an example of two identical risky as-
sets traded at different prices when financially constrained arbitrageurs cannot 
integrate segmented markets.  
13One important issue is whether or not the central bank should hold pur-
chased long-term assets until they mature. In fact, if the central bank will sell these 
assets later, a supply shock is only temporary while it is permanent if the central 
bank holds them until they mature. The simple two-period model considered in 
this article cannot distinguish a temporary shock from a permanent shock and the 
issue is beyond the scope of this article.  
14Even when the short rate is somewhat away from the zero bound, the term 
premium and the long-term interest rate are different. depending on the existence 
of the zero lower bound. If we consider the zero bound, the future possibility 
of hitting the bound alters the expected returns on the long-term bond and the 
short-term bond although the current short rate is not at the zero bound. 
15The public sector can be less risk-averse than the private sector because it 
can credibly pool the future economy-wide income by the taxing authority (Hol-
mström and Tirole). However, if the reduced arbitrage activities of the private 
sector are not driven by the heightened risk aversion of arbitrageurs but by the 
higher price sensitivity of the demand of the preferred-habitat investors, the pub-
lic sector’s intervention is not necessarily recommended. 
16The  financial  stress  index  jumped  from  about  0.5  in  August,  2007  to 
around 5.3 in September, 2008. 
17Other than the risk aversion, the size of purchase will also matter. However, 
calibrating the parameter to match the actual operation which targeted 2-to-10 
year bonds is difficult in this simple model with only two nearby bonds. 
18Recent empirical work by Gagnon and others (2010) shows that the im-
plicit forward guidance in FOMC statements did not have a substantial effect 
on the expected future short rate, while asset purchases decreased term premia 
significantly during 2009.  
19Two other dates when the 10-year Treasury yield increased by double-digit 
basis points are March 19 and April 3. The 10-year yield increased by 10 basis 
points on March 19 after a 51 basis point decline on March 18, indicating that 
arbitrageurs took profits after the big price movements in the previous day. On the 
other hand, the 10-year yield jumped by 14 basis points on April 3 without news 
on the improvement of economy. This can be attributed to expectations of the 
price pressure from the increased new issues of Treasury bonds coming in the next 
week. Thanks to Jonathan Wright for suggesting a check of these daily variations. 
20This approximation becomes exact at the time interval shrinks to zero. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  33
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